| Pressure | 8.2 psi / 56.5 kPa |
| Suit mass (1g) | TBD |
| Life support (primary) | Self-contained advanced PLSS concept |
| Life support (backup) | Redundant systems |
| EVA duration | 8 hours |
| Program | Artemis (Cancelled) |
| Agency | NASA |
| Manufacturer | NASA in-house design |
| First use | TBD |
| Status | Cancelled — mass overrun, transitioned to AxEMU |
| Donning / entry | Rear-entry hatch; improved mobility joints; higher operating pressure reducing prebreathe time |
8.2 psi operating pressure — highest of any US suit design, eliminating prebreathe requirement entirely
Originally planned Artemis lunar surface EVA suit before commercial pivot
Suit mass exceeded lander allocations; requirements breadth and subsystem mass growth degraded program feasibility; program ultimately cancelled
"Exploration programs need firm mass control and stable mission assumptions before subsystem elaboration begins"
Critical cautionary case study — directly led to NASA pivot to commercial AxEMU development under Axiom Space
First US EVA physically exhausting and low-productivity despite suit functioning; glove productivity inadequate for task completion
→ Suit capability and worksite design must be developed together, not sequentially
Unexpected arm growth when shoulder restraint cable failed; seized pulley caused overheating in crotch-thigh region
→ Critical restraint paths need redundancy or condition monitoring. Small mechanical hardware in pressure-load paths creates outsized crew risk
Suit inflation during Leonov's EVA made movement and airlock re-entry critically difficult — Leonov had to partially deflate to re-enter
→ Make ingress/egress and self-rescue a separate verification gate from EVA capability itself
Numbness, bladder bunching, and palm-bar wear-through into hand across multiple crew members
→ Glove verification must include extended-use comfort and injury surveillance, not just pressure integrity and cold-object performance
Water entered Luca Parmitano's helmet during EVA — vision impaired, comms degraded, breathing compromised
→ Cooling-water management is a primary safety-critical function, not a nuisance issue. Contamination tolerance must be designed in from day one
Suit mass exceeded or stressed downstream lander allocations; requirements breadth and subsystem mass growth degraded feasibility
→ Exploration programs need firm mass control and stable mission assumptions before subsystem elaboration begins. Lock the budget model early
"Established B.F. Goodrich as the lead US full-pressure suit contractor before Mercury existed"
"Parallel development track alongside Model O testing different mobility solutions"
"Naval and NASA pressure suit research tracks cross-pollinated significantly in this era"
