// CN-003 · China / CMSA

Feitian Gen-2 Tiangong

CASC · 2021–present
EVA Active fleet

Technical Specifications

PressureTBD
Suit mass (1g)287 lb
Life support (primary)Backpack PLSS — liquid cooling, oxygen, humidity, telemetry
Life support (backup)Station interfaces
EVA duration7 hours
ProgramTiangong Station
AgencyCMSA / CNSA
ManufacturerCASC
First use2021
StatusActive fleet
Donning / entrySecond-generation EVA suit; white with colored crew-ID trims

Engineering Analysis

Key Subsystem Architecture

~130 kg; ~$4.14m unit cost; >7hr EVA; 15 uses/3 years standard — exceeded by 2025; liquid cooling; telemetry

Mission Role

Tiangong station assembly, maintenance and external payload tasks

Limitations & Failures

Mass, dexterity, maintenance turnaround and consumables management are active watch items; lifespan now being extended

Program Lesson
"Once a suit becomes a fleet asset, lifecycle economics and telemetry matter more than peak performance figures"
Future Relevance

Active ISS-equivalent benchmark — China is building a sustained EVA operating model, not a demonstration capability

Documented Failure Cases
High 1965

First US EVA physically exhausting and low-productivity despite suit functioning; glove productivity inadequate for task completion

→ Suit capability and worksite design must be developed together, not sequentially

High 1960s

Unexpected arm growth when shoulder restraint cable failed; seized pulley caused overheating in crotch-thigh region

→ Critical restraint paths need redundancy or condition monitoring. Small mechanical hardware in pressure-load paths creates outsized crew risk

High 1965

Suit inflation during Leonov's EVA made movement and airlock re-entry critically difficult — Leonov had to partially deflate to re-enter

→ Make ingress/egress and self-rescue a separate verification gate from EVA capability itself

High 1980s–1990s

Numbness, bladder bunching, and palm-bar wear-through into hand across multiple crew members

→ Glove verification must include extended-use comfort and injury surveillance, not just pressure integrity and cold-object performance

Critical 2013

Water entered Luca Parmitano's helmet during EVA — vision impaired, comms degraded, breathing compromised

→ Cooling-water management is a primary safety-critical function, not a nuisance issue. Contamination tolerance must be designed in from day one

High 2024–

Risk that Feitian Gen-2 orbital EVA success may drive incremental adaptation to lunar surface rather than treating Wangyu as a new architecture branch

→ Orbital EVA success is not a sufficient baseline for lunar surface operations — treat as a new product architecture, not an upgrade

Medium 2021–

Suit lifespan initially limited to 15 EVAs over 3 years; exceeded in operations before upgrade to 20 EVAs/4 years D/E series

→ Track cost-per-EVA, turnaround time and anomaly-free hours as primary KPIs once a suit enters fleet operations

// Related Suits

Same Program Family

CN-001 IVA

Shenzhou IVA / Rescue Suit

CMSA / CNSA · CASC
2003–present
Pressure
TBD
System mass
TBD
Life support
Vehicle oxygen + emergency tanks
EVA duration
N/A

"Rescue suit discipline must be kept separate from EVA product line — do not overbuild IVA with EVA objectives"

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CN-002 EVA

Feitian Gen-1

CMSA / CNSA · CASC
2008
Pressure
400 hPa
System mass
TBD
Life support
Self-contained EVA backpack oxygen
EVA duration
N/A

"Pragmatic dual-track approach — import to reduce mission risk while demonstrating domestic capability simultaneously"

View Full Archive →
CN-004 EVA

Wangyu Lunar Suit

CMSA / CASC · CASC
2024–2030
Pressure
TBD
System mass
TBD
Life support
Self-contained lunar PLSS (details not public)
EVA duration
N/A

"Lunar suit must be treated as a new architecture branch — not an incremental Feitian derivative — due to dust, terrain and thermal differenc…"

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