Enhanced EMU

First US EVA physically exhausting and low-productivity despite suit functioning; glove productivity inadequate for task completion

→ Suit capability and worksite design must be developed together, not sequentially

Unexpected arm growth when shoulder restraint cable failed; seized pulley caused overheating in crotch-thigh region

→ Critical restraint paths need redundancy or condition monitoring. Small mechanical hardware in pressure-load paths creates outsized crew risk

Suit inflation during Leonov's EVA made movement and airlock re-entry critically difficult — Leonov had to partially deflate to re-enter

→ Make ingress/egress and self-rescue a separate verification gate from EVA capability itself

Numbness, bladder bunching, and palm-bar wear-through into hand across multiple crew members

→ Glove verification must include extended-use comfort and injury surveillance, not just pressure integrity and cold-object performance

Water entered Luca Parmitano's helmet during EVA — vision impaired, comms degraded, breathing compromised

→ Cooling-water management is a primary safety-critical function, not a nuisance issue. Contamination tolerance must be designed in from day one

Aging suits, obsolescence, contractor quality issues, supply-chain weaknesses — OIG 2025 flagged as mission risk

→ Industrial-base fragility becomes a technical failure mode in long-lived fleets. Supplier resilience must be a first-class design and program requirement

Repeated orbital use shifted primary risk toward maintenance, drying, recharge, and replaceable component management

→ Not all critical failures are dramatic punctures. Slow fleet degradation from poor maintenance design matters as much as acute failures