| Pressure | 4.3 psi / 29.6 kPa |
| Suit mass (1g) | 309 lb (system) |
| Life support (primary) | PLSS 8 hr; regenerative CO2 removal |
| Life support (backup) | SOP 30 min |
| EVA duration | 8 hours |
| Program | ISS |
| Agency | NASA |
| Manufacturer | Hamilton Sundstrand + ILC |
| First use | 1998 |
| Status | Active legacy / aging |
| Donning / entry | Modular rear-entry HUT with SAFER, REBA, heated glove, METOX |
Heated glove, REBA power, METOX CO2, ISS interface upgrades
ISS assembly and maintenance — primary orbital EVA workhorse
EVA-23 water intrusion 2013; glove injuries; aging hardware; OIG 2025 critical sustainment flag
"Long-life EVA programs shift from design problems to sustainment, anomaly and industrial-base problems"
Primary direct predecessor to any replacement orbital EVA system
Water entered Luca Parmitano's helmet during EVA — vision impaired, comms degraded, breathing compromised
→ Cooling-water management is a primary safety-critical function, not a nuisance issue. Contamination tolerance must be designed in from day one
Aging suits, obsolescence, contractor quality issues, supply-chain weaknesses — OIG 2025 flagged as mission risk
→ Industrial-base fragility becomes a technical failure mode in long-lived fleets. Supplier resilience must be a first-class design and program requirement
Repeated orbital use shifted primary risk toward maintenance, drying, recharge, and replaceable component management
→ Not all critical failures are dramatic punctures. Slow fleet degradation from poor maintenance design matters as much as acute failures
"Even a simple IVA suit needs water survival and cockpit visibility contingencies"
"Suit performance cannot be separated from translation aids and workload planning"
"Lunar EVA required not just survival but sustained human work capability"
