// VAR-009 · United States

Apollo A7LB + PLSS-7

ILC Industries + Hamilton Standard · 1968–1975
IEVA Retired
Apollo A7LB + PLSS-7 spacesuit

Technical Specifications

Pressure3.7 psi / 25.5 kPa
Suit mass (1g)212 lb (system)
Life support (primary)PLSS-7 nominal 7 hr
Life support (backup)OPS 30 min
EVA duration7 hours
ProgramApollo
AgencyNASA
ManufacturerILC Industries + Hamilton Standard
First use1971
StatusRetired
Donning / entryImproved mobility and consumables for extended traverses

Engineering Analysis

Key Subsystem Architecture

Extended EVA duration; rover compatibility; improved hip/waist mobility for seated rover ops

Mission Role

Apollo 15–17 extended lunar EVA + lunar rover operations; ASTP derivative

Limitations & Failures

Still custom, maintenance-intensive; cable/pulley restraint risks persisted

Program Lesson
"Endurance and traversal demands exposed the need for mobility, dust robustness, and rover integration"
Future Relevance

Strong analog for planetary EVA with surface transportation — directly relevant to Artemis rover plans

Documented Failure Cases
High 1965

First US EVA physically exhausting and low-productivity despite suit functioning; glove productivity inadequate for task completion

→ Suit capability and worksite design must be developed together, not sequentially

High 1964–65

Severe discomfort nicknamed 'crotch cutter' — fit and pressure-load path geometry produced painful localized loading

→ Localized contact loads can kill an otherwise promising concept. Pressure mapping and seat-interface studies are required

High 1960s

Unexpected arm growth when shoulder restraint cable failed; seized pulley caused overheating in crotch-thigh region

→ Critical restraint paths need redundancy or condition monitoring. Small mechanical hardware in pressure-load paths creates outsized crew risk

High 1965

Suit inflation during Leonov's EVA made movement and airlock re-entry critically difficult — Leonov had to partially deflate to re-enter

→ Make ingress/egress and self-rescue a separate verification gate from EVA capability itself

High 1980s–1990s

Numbness, bladder bunching, and palm-bar wear-through into hand across multiple crew members

→ Glove verification must include extended-use comfort and injury surveillance, not just pressure integrity and cold-object performance

Critical 2013

Water entered Luca Parmitano's helmet during EVA — vision impaired, comms degraded, breathing compromised

→ Cooling-water management is a primary safety-critical function, not a nuisance issue. Contamination tolerance must be designed in from day one

// Related Suits

Same Program Family

PROTO-001 Prototype EXPERIMENTAL
Mk II Model O spacesuit photograph

Mk II Model O

USAF · B.F. Goodrich
1956
Pressure
TBD
System mass
TBD
Life support
Not publicly documented
EVA duration
N/A

"Established B.F. Goodrich as the lead US full-pressure suit contractor before Mercury existed"

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PROTO-002 Prototype EXPERIMENTAL
Mk II Model R spacesuit photograph

Mk II Model R

USAF · B.F. Goodrich
1956
Pressure
TBD
System mass
TBD
Life support
Not publicly documented
EVA duration
N/A

"Parallel development track alongside Model O testing different mobility solutions"

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PROTO-003 Prototype EXPERIMENTAL
Mk IV Arrowhead spacesuit photograph

Mk IV Arrowhead

US Navy · B.F. Goodrich
late 1950s
Pressure
TBD
System mass
TBD
Life support
Not publicly documented
EVA duration
N/A

"Naval and NASA pressure suit research tracks cross-pollinated significantly in this era"

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